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Since 2003, > 51 countries have confirmed
the presence of type-H5 avian influenza
in animals. According to the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) > 220 mil-
lion poultry have been culled since the end of
2003 to control the spread of the virus (FAO
2006). The World Health Organization
(WHO) confirmed 41 human deaths from
avian influenza A (AIA) H5N1 in 2005, and
74 people have already died in 2006, more
than twice the pace of the previous year
(WHO 2006a, 2006b). The current state of
alert provides an unprecedented opportunity
for the global community to devise strategies
to decrease mortality rates in the event of pan-
demic influenza. An integral component of
these strategies is the manufacture of an effec-
tive vaccine. However, this cannot be pro-
duced until the emergence and identification
of the pandemic influenza strain (McKimm-
Breschkin et al. 2003). During the time it will
take to prepare a vaccine, the WHO (2006)
recommends Tamiflu [oseltamivir phosphate
(OP); Figure 1] for the treatment and pre-
vention of pandemic influenza. Tamiflu, pro-
duced and marketed by Hoffmann-La Roche
Inc. (Nutley, NJ, USA), is a rationally
designed selective inhibitor of influenza A
and B neuraminidase (NA) (Kim et al. 1997;
Li et al. 1998; von Itzstein et al. 1993). After
absorption in the gastrointestinal tract,
Tamiflu is converted to the active NA
inhibitor oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) by
hepatic esterases (Figure 1, Table 1). OC
binds tightly to the highly conserved active
site of the viral NA (Air and Laver 1989;
Baker et al. 1987), thereby inhibiting the
action of the enzyme that is needed for release
of progeny virions from the surface of infected
cells (Bardsley-Elliot and Noble 1999; Palese
and Compans 1976). 
Stockpiles of Tamiflu have been amassed
by many nations worldwide to be used in the
event of an influenza pandemic (in millions
of treatment courses): Belgium, 3; France,
14; Germany, 16; Greece, 0.2; Italy, 30;
Netherlands, 5; New Zealand, 0.84; Russia,
150; Spain, 10; United Kingdom, 14.6; and
United States, 81 (BBC 2006). The WHO
and the United States have stockpiled an addi-
tional 5–6 million courses combined for the
purpose of “blanketing” regions upon confir-
mation of an outbreak (F. Hoffman-La Roche
Ltd. 2006). The ring or blanketing prophy-
laxis strategy, an approach for delivering large
amounts of antiviral drugs to people within a
defined area surrounding a limited localized
influenza outbreak, will greatly increase the
overall use of Tamiflu in a region compared
with earlier strategies that aimed to treat only
clinically infected cases (Ferguson et al.
2006). Plans for antiviral stockpile deploy-
ment are country specific because of the vari-
ations in demographics, infrastructure, and
available stockpiles. However, most plans are
structured around WHO preparedness plans
(WHO 2006c).
In the event of a human outbreak, the cur-
rent WHO strategy (WHO 2006c) recom-
mends that all infected individuals (> 1 year of
age) receive a 5-day course of 750 mg Tamiflu
(i.e., 75 mg twice per day for 5 days). This
quantity will also be needed for a 10-day pro-
phylaxis course (i.e., 75 mg once per day for
10 days), which could be extended for several
weeks until there is no further risk of exposure
to AIA. Given the large doses of Tamiflu, it is
highly significant that approximately 70% of
each oral dose is excreted renally in the active
antiviral form, OC, with up to 20% appearing
in the feces (50% as OP and 50% as OC;
Table 1) (He et al. 1999). Hence, up to 80%
of an oral dose of OP can be excreted as OC.
No observed oxidative metabolites of OC have
been reported in humans, indicating that OC is
resistant to cytochrome P450 mixed-function
oxidases and glucuronosyltransferase (He et al.
1999; Sweeny et al. 2000). OC has not been
reported to undergo appreciable mineralization
based on a standard Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) biodegradability test [European
Medicines Agency (EMEA) 2005]. Hence,
the active antiviral, OC, has the potential to
be maintained in rivers receiving treated
wastewater.
The acute timescales involved in pan-
demic treatment and containment and the
biophysicochemical characteristics of Tamiflu
prompted us to ask whether the concentration
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BACKGROUND: The threat of pandemic influenza has focused attention and resources on virus
surveillance, prevention, and containment. The World Health Organization has strongly recom-
mended the use of the antiviral drug Tamiflu both to treat and prevent pandemic influenza infec-
tion. A major concern for the long-term efficacy of this strategy is to limit the development of
Tamiflu-resistant influenza strains. However, in the event of a pandemic, hundreds of millions of
courses of Tamiflu, stockpiled globally, will be rapidly deployed. Given its apparent resistance
to biodegradation and hydrophilicity, oseltamivir carboxylate (OC), the active antiviral and
metabolite of Tamiflu, is predicted to enter receiving riverwater from sewage treatment works in
its active form.
OBJECTIVE: Our objective in this study was to determine the likely concentrations of OC released
into U.S. and U.K. river catchments using hydrologic modeling and current assumptions about the
course and management of an influenza pandemic. 
DISCUSSION: We predict that high concentrations of OC (micrograms per liter) capable of inhibit-
ing influenza virus replication would be sustained for periods of several weeks, presenting an
increased risk for the generation of antiviral resistance and genetic exchange between influenza
viruses in wildfowl. Owing to the apparent recalcitrance of OC in sewage treatment works, wide-
spread use of Tamiflu during an influenza pandemic also poses a potentially significant, uncharac-
terized, ecotoxicologic risk in each affected nation’s waterways. 
CONCLUSION: To gauge the hazard presented by Tamiflu use during a pandemic, we recommend
a) direct measurement of Tamiflu persistence, biodegradation, and transformation in the environ-
ment; b) further modeling of likely drug concentrations in the catchments of countries where
humans and waterfowl come into frequent close contact, and where significant Tamiflu deployment
is envisaged; and c) further characterization of the risks of generating Tamiflu-resistant viruses in
OC-exposed wildfowl. 
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of OC in river water presents an ecotoxicologic
risk or a pharmacologically relevant risk to has-
tening the development of Tamiflu resistance
in wildfowl. 
Methods and Discussion
Tamiflu was launched by Roche in North
America in October 1999, but there is very lit-
tle research regarding the environmental fate
and toxicology of the drug. OC has both
amine and carboxylate groups in the molecule
imparting hydrophilicity, a low partition coef-
ficient (log P of 1.1), and high water solubility
(588 mg/mL at 25°C) (American Hospital
Formulary Service 2006). These physico-
chemical features of OC will minimize loss by
sorption to sewage sludge during wastewater
treatment. In the absence of empirical evidence
to the contrary, Relenza (GlaxoSmithKline,
Brentford, Middlesex, UK), a structurally
similar NA inhibitor, was used as a model for
estimating the ecotoxicologic and environ-
mental fate of Tamiflu. Relenza is a) not
likely to sorb to soil or sediment if released
directly into the environment; b) not likely to
partition to fats; c) not readily volatile;
d) readily soluble in water; e) chemically sta-
ble in water [thus, hydrolysis is unlikely to be
a significant depletion mechanism (half-life
> 1 year); and f ) is not readily mineralized
(aerobic; degradation < 1% in 28 days in acti-
vated sludge) (GlaxoSmithKline 2004).
To assess the potential biodegradability of
Tamiflu and OC, we used a metabolic path-
way prediction system that recognizes the
organic functional groups found in a com-
pound and predicts transformations based on
metabolic rules (Hou et al. 2004). Only one
biotransformation for OC was generated by
the program, employing an amine oxidase.
The general structure of OC is not radically
changed by this biotransformation, thus the
OC metabolite might retain NA inhibitor
properties. The only published account of the
biodegradability of Tamiflu is within the doc-
umentation submitted by Roche to the EMEA
(2005) in which it refers to the OECD carbon
dioxide evolution test (Modified Sturm test)
that investigates the mineralization of Tamiflu
in an aerobic slurry enriched with sewage
sludge. At the conclusion of the 28-day assay,
< 20% of Tamiflu had been converted to car-
bon dioxide, demonstrating its recalcitrance
and likely persistence in sewage treatment
plants (EMEA 2005). The apparent resistance
of OC to further biotransformation in the
human body (He et al. 1999) and the limited
biodegradation reported in carbon dioxide
evolution tests (EMEA 2005), plus its struc-
tural similarity to the environmentally persis-
tent NA inhibitor Relenza, strongly suggests
that both Tamiflu and OC will persist in
wastewater and river water.
We examined catchments in the United
Kingdom and the United States to generate
examples of possible OC water concentra-
tions. Catchment boundaries and the human
population within the United Kingdom for
1991 were provided by the computerized digi-
tal terrain network (Bracken and Martin
1989). However, from 1991 to 2004, the
population of England and Wales has grown
by 6.8%; therefore, we estimated the 2004
population by scaling up. We predicted the
natural flow from the catchment surface area,
discharge point, and geographic location, as
described by Young et al. (2003). We calcu-
lated the annual mean flow and available dilu-
tion per capita from the mean annual rainfall
for 1961–1991 and from assumptions on
runoff and evaporation for that location
(Table 2) (Holmes et al. 2002). 
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Table 1. Summary of mean pharmacokinetic values for absorption, distribution, metabolism, and elimina-
tion of Tamiflu (OP) and the active antiviral OC (Li et al. 1998) as a proportion of a single 75-mg oral dose
(He et al. 1999).
Excreted
Blood Urine Feces Total fraction 
Total-OC Protein bound OP OC OP OC excreted
75-mg dose 0.8 0.03 0.05 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.95
Table 2. Populations, naturalized flows, and projected number of days with significant concentrations of antiviral in catchments in the United Kingdom and the
United States.
Days with Days with
Population Population Dilution > 1 nM OC > 50 nM OC
Catchment Location (2004) Flow (m3/day) Area (km2) density/km2 (m3/head/day) R0 = 2.0 R0 = 1.7 R0 = 2.0 R0 = 1.7
Lee Northeast London, UK 1,777,126 580,003 1,412 1,258 0.3 43 50 16 9
Don South Yorkshire, UK 1,309,305 1,436,832 1,305 1,003 1.1 36 44 0 0
Mersey Lancashire, UK 2,860,635 3,405,024 2,043 1,400 1.2 36 42 0 0
Nene Northamptonshire, UK 631,680 813,024 1,799 351 1.3 36 43 0 0
Thames Southern England, UK 4,430,918 7,001,856 9,959 445 1.6 34 41 0 0
Lower Colorado Southwest USA 5,861,200 1,223,424 350,060 17 0.2 58 62 23 16
Schuylkill Northeast USA 1,950,400 7,661,081 5,000 390 3.9 35 31 0 0
Trinity Southern USA 5,104,300 20,864,273 46,540 110 4.1 35 30 0 0
Miami (Ohio) Central USA 1,809,700 16,154,738 13,900 130 8.9 25 19 0 0
Merrimack Northeast USA 2,090,300 19,315,714 13,030 160 9.2 25 12 0 0
Kansas Central USA 1,333,700 16,834,314 155,660 9 12.6 21 8 0 0
Upper Mississippi Central USA 5,291,500 82,537,673 174,735 30 15.6 16 6 0 0
Atlanta headwaters Southern USA 3,894,400 63,791,774 52,860 74 16.4 15 0 0 0
Sacramento Central West USA 2,589,100 59,365,426 72,260 36 22.9 5 0 0 0
White Central USA 2,465,600 65,281,975 31,600 78 26.5 0 0 0 0
Columbia Northwest USA 6,306,400 639,894,795 570,135 11 101.5 0 0 0 0
R0, basic reproductive number.
Figure 1. Structure of the prodrug Tamiflu (OP; CAS Registry no. 204255-11-8; molecular weight, 410.4) and
the active form OC (CAS Registry no. 187227-45-8; molecular weight, 284.35).
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Eleven substantial catchments have been
examined in the United States as part of a
modeling exercise for pharmaceuticals
(Anderson et al. 2004). These catchments were
selected to represent the variety present within
the United States (Figure 2A): They represent
19% of the land area, contain 14% of the
human population, and receive waste from
1,112 sewage treatment plants (Anderson et al.
2004). In general, these selected American
catchments are larger than those in the United
Kingdom, with lower population densities,
and thus have more available dilution per
head of population. The Lower Colorado
River is an exception, being in an arid area
with very low flow. Five catchments within
the United Kingdom have been selected for
the modeling exercise, particularly focusing
on low naturalized flow (Figure 2B). 
The concentration of OC in river water
on a given day is provided by the following
equation:
WOC = (ΣC × D × 0.8)/
(F × 1,000 × P × 0.4104), [1]
where WOC is the OC concentration (nano-
molar) in river water; ΣC is the sum of active
courses consumed by clinically infected people
in a U.K. or U.S. catchment within the previ-
ous 5 days (reflecting the recommended treat-
ment course of Tamiflu); D is the daily dose of
Tamiflu (150,000 μg; 0.8 is the predicted max-
imum fraction of an oral dose of Tamiflu that
is converted to OC and released into the waste-
water); F is the available dilution per person
(cubic meters per day per person); and P is the
population in the catchment. For the United
Kingdom and the United States, we used the
clinical case incidence per day suggested by
Ferguson et al. (2006), in which they modeled
a virus with a high or moderate basic reproduc-
tive number (R0) of either 2 or 1.7. R0 is the
average number of secondary infections pro-
duced by an infected individual in a fully sus-
ceptible population (Anderson and May
1991). We divided the number of clinically
infected people per day by the respective total
population to yield the fraction of the popula-
tion infected on a daily basis. This fraction was
used to estimate daily numbers of clinically
infected people for each catchment. In reality,
a range of concentrations would occur across
the different reaches of a catchment. However,
the mean concentrations from which natural-
ized flow is based indicate concentrations that
could be expected and also allow comparisons
to be made across different catchments.
Multiplying the naturalized flow by 1,000 con-
verts the units to liters of river water; to convert
units from micrograms of OP per liter to
nanomolar OC requires division by 0.410.
In brief, the model assumes that a) all
clinical cases were treated at the first sign of
infection with a full course of Tamiflu lasting
5 days, with 100% compliance; b) Tamiflu
was used only by clinically infected people, as
determined by Ferguson et al. (2006); c) 80%
of the ingested Tamiflu was released as OC;
and d) all of the OC entering the catchment
was flushed out in 1 day (an underestimate for
most of these catchments). The decision to use
only clinically infected people in the model
ensures a conservative estimate of OC in river-
water because the model omits prophylactic
use and personal stockpiles; the latter was
omitted because the extent of personal stock-
piling and the quality of drug being stockpiled
is unknown. Depending on how the pan-
demic might develop, prophylaxis might
increase projections by > 100%. 
Figure 3 shows broad estimates (based on
the average flow prediction) of the concentra-
tion of OC in river water over the time course
of an epidemic for viruses with moderate or
high transmission (R0, 1.7 or 2.0). Table 2
provides estimates for the number of consecu-
tive days that OC is projected to exceed 1 nM
and 50 nM. As highlighted in Figure 3A, OC
concentrations in the Lee catchment (R0 = 2.0)
exceed 95 nM for nearly 1 week. Similarly, we
predict that the Lower Colorado catchment
(Figure 3A) would have river water concentra-
tions > 90 nM for 10 days, reaching a maxi-
mum concentration of 112 nM (R0 = 2.0;
Figure 3B). The Colorado catchment is pre-
dicted to contain > 50 nM OC for 62 consecu-
tive days, notably in the lower transmission
level conditions (R0 = 1.7; Figure 3D). All
five catchments investigated in the United
Kingdom are predicted to have > 34 consecu-
tive days with OC > 1 nM (R0 ≥ 1.7). Owing
to lower population density in many of the
U.S. catchments, the peak concentrations
achieved during a pandemic are approximately
10 times less than U.K. river water OC levels.
However, of the U.S. catchments modeled,
9 of 11 attained river water OC levels > 1 nM
when R0 = 2.0 (Figure 3B) and 8 of 11 catch-
ments when R0 = 1.7 (Figure 3D).
A river water OC concentration of 1 nM
is 1.6–625 times higher than three commonly
Singer et al.
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Figure 3. Predicted concentration of OC in UK (A, C) and U.S. (B, D) rivers generated from a population with
a cumulative total clinical infection rate of 35% (R0 = 2.0; A, B) or 25% (R0 = 1.7; C, D), assuming a generation
time of 2.6 days and that 50% of infected people are sufficiently ill to be classified as clinical cases. Refer to
the right-hand y-axes for values for Lee (A, C) and Lower Colorado (B, D). The day of outbreak refers to the
days after a global influenza outbreak as a function of the expected importation of infection from overseas
[as per Figure 1A and B in Ferguson et al. (2006)].
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Figure 2. Illustration of the distribution of catchments we investigated within (A) the United States
[adapted from Anderson et al. (2004)] and (B) the United Kingdom.
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prescribed drugs in U.K. river water: a) the
oral contraceptive ethinylestradiol at 1.6 pM
(Johnson et al. 2006); b) the pain killer
diclofenac at 139 pM (Johnson et al. 2006);
and c) the beta blocker propranolol at 594 pM
(Ashton et al. 2004). Although not discussed
in any detail here, the range of OC concentra-
tions predicted in river water may have
uncharacterized ecotoxicologic consequences.
Based on the structure–activity relationship
determined using toxTree (version 1.00;
Ideaconsult Ltd., Sofia, Bulgaria), both
Tamiflu and OC are predicted to be “class 3”
toxicologic hazards. ToxTree employs the
Cramer decision tree approach, relying pri-
marily on chemical structures to estimate toxic
hazard to establish priorities for more in-depth
toxicologic testing (Cramer et al. 1978). In an
acute toxicity study in Daphnia magna, OP
was classified as harmful according to the
European Union Directive 67/548/EEC
(EMEA 2005). The EMEA documentation
on the ecotoxicity of Tamiflu states, 
Considering ecotoxicological properties, use pat-
tern, dosage and maximal estimated amounts of
oseltamivir to be placed on the market, no expo-
sure levels of concern to the environment are to be
expected. (EMEA 2005)
However, it is unclear whether this ecotoxico-
logic risk assessment for OP was intended to
apply to pandemic avian influenza conditions.
In summary, we raise a number of, as yet,
unconsidered risks to the environment from
Tamiflu use during a pandemic, most notably,
the ecotoxicologic hazard associated with the
release of a uniquely structured, biochemically
resistant antiviral drug. The recalcitrance of
OC to metabolism in humans, sewage treat-
ment works, and river water will enable IC50
(concentration that causes 50% inhibition)-
relevant concentrations to be reached in catch-
ments, potentially influencing the generation
of Tamiflu-resistant AIA in wildfowl.
The avian species most commonly infected
with AI are wildfowl of the order Anseriformes
(e.g., ducks, geese, swans) (Alexander 2000).
The AIA virus is believed to be transmitted
between waterfowl by the fecal–oral route as
they imbibe contaminated water, although in
a recent report with one AIA strain, Normile
(2006) demonstrated that the virus was shed
far more heavily in the duck pharynx than
through the feces. In birds, the virus replicates
in the lower intestinal tract (small and large
intestine) and in the lungs. In the gut it buds
from the surface of mucosal cells into the
lumen (Webster et al. 1978). In the event of
widescale Tamiflu use, waterfowl would
ingest large quantities of active OC together
with virus in their daily water intake, ranging
from 64 mL/kg/day in glaucous-winged gulls
(Walter and Hughes 1978) to 200–300
mL/kg/day in duck species (Hughes 2003).
Because of the poor bioavailability of OC rela-
tive to its prodrug, Tamiflu (Kim et al. 1997;
Li et al. 1998), a high percentage of OC
ingested by avian species will remain in the
intestinal tract, the primary site of viral repli-
cation in Anseriformes. Waterfowl have been
shown to reabsorb urine into the rectum,
ileum, and/or ceca, amounting to as much as
40% of a mallard duck’s daily water influx,
thereby concentrating nontransported ions
and molecules in the lumina (Hughes et al.
1999). Hence, the concentration of OC in the
gut of waterfowl might be higher than that
found in the riverwater. The published IC50 of
the NA enzyme for OC varies widely depend-
ing on the assay method and AIA isolate, rang-
ing from 0.01 to 114.0 nM OC (Ferraris et al.
2005; Hurt et al. 2004; Mendel et al. 1998;
Roche 2004). Le et al. (2005) reported the
IC50 for drug-resistant H5N1 virus (A/Hanoi/
30408/2005) to be 90 nM. 
The projected concentrations of OC in
river water (Table 2) could therefore drive the
selection of resistant strains of AIA in the gut
of waterfowl. Notably, it is relatively easy to
generate Tamiflu-resistant mutants because
single amino acid substitutions in NA have
conferred high-level OC resistance (Colacino
et al. 1997; de Jong et al. 2005; Le et al. 2005;
McKimm-Breschkin et al. 2003; Mendel and
Sidwell 1998). Furthermore, the gradual rise
of OC to IC50 and IC90-relevant concentra-
tions during the course of an AIA epidemic, as
predicted here, would be more effective in
generating Tamiflu-resistant mutants than
would a sudden spike. A similar gradual
increase is used to select resistant mutants in
laboratory experiments.
Conclusions
We recognize that a highly pathogenic
human-to-human transmissible AIA strain is
unlikely to be frequently transmitted between
humans and waterfowl (Russell and Webster
2005). However, the possibility of promoting
new OC resistant AIA strains in wildfowl
introduces another important factor to be
considered in our international AIA strategy.
This is particularly important given the
mobility of migrating wildfowl. Occasional
co-infection in wildfowl could generate new
strains incorporating Tamiflu-resistant NA
genes. This scenario is most likely to occur in
southeast Asian countries where humans and
waterfowl frequently come into close direct or
indirect contact, and where significant
Tamiflu deployment is envisaged. We there-
fore recommend similar, but more detailed,
modeling exercises in such countries to assess
the potential environmental and virologic risks
that we have highlighted. It will also be impor-
tant to identify the locations that provide the
greatest intersection between human waste-
water effluent and waterfowl migration
within relevant countries. More detailed stud-
ies need to be conducted to identify the
extent of biotransformation that OC might
undergo in different environments, in addi-
tion to assessing the susceptibility of OC to
photodegradation. Attention should be given
to developing methods to minimize the
release of OC into the waste stream, such as
biological and chemical pretreatment in toi-
lets, which could eliminate much of the
“downstream” risk. Regulatory guidance
might be needed to ensure proper disposal of
the Tamiflu stockpiles once they expire. 
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